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ABSTRACT 
In mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), nodes usually belong to different authorities and pursue different 
goals. In order to maximize their own performance, nodes in such networks tend to be selfish and are not 
willing to forward packets for benefit of others. Meanwhile, some nodes may behave maliciously and try 
to disrupt the network through wasting other nodes resources in a very large scale. In this article, we 
present a reputation-based attack resistant cooperation stimulation (RACS) system which ensures that 
damage caused by malicious nodes can be bounded and cooperation among the selfish nodes can be 
enforced. Mathematical analyses of the system as well as the simulation results have confirmed 
effectiveness of our proposed system. RACS is completely self-organizing and distributed. It does not 
require any tamper-proof hardware or central management policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An ad hoc network is a group of mobile nodes communicating with each other in 
single/multiple hops, without any centralized administration or fixed backbone network 
infrastructure [1-10]. Along with emergency and military situations, ad hoc networks are being 
envisaged in civilian usage also. On account of these diverse categories of applications, nodes 
usually belong to different authorities and may not pursue a common goal. Moreover, in order 
to save limited resources such as battery power, nodes may tend to be selfish and disagree to 
unconditionally forward packets of others. One possible way to stimulate cooperation is to use 
payment-based methods. An approach was proposed by using virtual currency called ‘nuglets’ 
as payments for packet forwarding, which was then improved in using credit counters [1]. 
However, tamper-proof hardware is required at each node to count the credits. Sprite [2] was 
proposed to encourage cooperation among network elements or nodes. Although, it releases the 
requirement of a tamper-proof hardware, a centralized credit-clearance service trusted by all 
nodes, is recognized as indispensable. This violates the desirable fully distributed structure of ad 
hoc network.  
  The first reputation based system for ad hoc networks was proposed to mitigate a node’s 
misbehaviour, where each network element launches a watchdog to monitor its neighbours 
packet forwarding activities. After that, CORE [3] and CONFIDANT [4] were proposed to 
detect and isolate misbehaving nodes and thus, make it unattractive to deny cooperation. These 
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schemes treat all misbehaving nodes in the same manner, irrespective of their degree of selfish 
or malicious activity. Sometimes, innocent cooperating nodes have to suffer due to 
misbehaviour of other nodes and incapability of the underlying mechanism to identify the 
culprit(s). These experiences clearly show that, before ad hoc networks are successfully 
deployed, security concerns must be addressed in full proof manner. Most of the schemes 
proposed in the literature to address security issues in ad hoc networks, focus on preventing 
attackers from entering the network through secure key distribution and neighbour discovery. 
These are unable to handle the situation where malicious nodes successfully enter the network. 
The issue is quite worthy of attention and technically challenging since access control in 
autonomous ad hoc networks is usually very loose.   
  George Karakostas et. Al. proposed a protocol for emergency connectivity [5] in ad hoc 
networks with selfish nodes. This is inspired by the CONFIDANT [4] protocol where reputation 
mechanism is implemented through the ability of any node to define a threshold of tolerance for 
any of its neighbours and to cut the connection to any of these neighbours that refuse to forward 
an amount of flow above the threshold. The protocol is modelled as a game and necessary and 
sufficient conditions are given for the existence of connected Nash equilibria. However, it 
remains silent about the existence of malicious nodes and cannot differentiate between the facts 
when a node intentionally drops a packet or drops a packet due to scarcity of battery power. 
  The technique of activity-based overhearing [6] is proposed by Frank Kargl in [6]. Each router 
tries to overhear forwarding of data packets by its next hop. The date of last regular activity of a 
downlink neighbour is stored in a table. When it sends a packet to another node and cannot  
detect forwarding of the packet by the next relaying node in the path, this is esteemed a selfish 
behaviour only when there has been a recent regular activity by this node. The monitoring node 
triggers an alarm only when it detects a certain number of packets being dropped within a 
certain timeframe. 
  In the present article, we have separately considered the various attacking mechanisms used by 
selfish and malicious nodes. Objective of a selfish node is to maximize the benefits it can 
extract out of the network while preserving its resources as much as possible. On the other hand, 
objective of a malicious node is to maximize the damage it can cause to the network (may be 
without any explicit advantage), at the cost of its own resources, till the expense is tolerable. 
Possible types of attacking procedures have been rigorously analyzed and sufficient intelligence 
is artificially embedded within the nodes to prevent such harmful activities. Cooperation is 
thereby enforced as the best policy of a node for survival in a mobile ad hoc network. Moreover, 
the system of RACS is completely distributed and does not require any tamper-proof hardware. 
It can identify the malfunctioning nodes with high percentage of accuracy and determine their 
punishment according to their degree of un-cooperating attitude, both during transmission of 
data packets and route discovery.  
   This paper is organized as follows. Various attacking schemes employed in ad hoc networks 
are mentioned in section 2. Section 3 describes the system model in detail and analyzes 
behaviour of associated nodes under different circumstances. Communication algorithm of 
RACS is provided in section 4. Simulation studies appear in section 5 and finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. SELFISH AND MALICIOUS ACTIVITIES 
In an autonomous ad hoc network, each node is equipped with a battery of limited power supply 
and may act as a service provider. To extend own life, a node may exhibit selfish behaviour by 
benefiting from resources provided by other nodes, without, in return, making available 
resources of their own devices. RACS encourages selfish nodes (directly or as witnesses) in 
forwarding activities by rewarding them with significant increment in reputation. Malicious 
fellows, on the other hand, do not care about the rewards and cause harm to the network in 
multi-faced manners as much as possible, till the expense is tolerable. If a node is found to be 
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malfunctioning deliberately, RACS recommends it to be isolated from the network. In general, 
attacking mechanisms in ad hoc networks are mentioned below: 
 
• Emulating Link Breakage – When a node na requires to transmit a message packet to the 
next router nb on a communication path, nb may simply keep silent to na to let it believe 
that its successor in the route has gone out of its radio-range. This phenomenon is 
termed as link breakage attack. Details about this attacking mechanism and its treatment 
in RACS appear in section 3.2. 
• Deliberately Delaying The Traffic – A node may be idle in forwarding of messages and 
deliberately introduce delay. Detection of this kind of attack and corresponding 
adjustment in reputation of the guilty nodes, are demonstrated in section 3.3. 
• Injecting Enormous Traffic – Malicious nodes can inject an overwhelming amount of 
traffic (frequent flooding of data or route-request packets) to overload the network and 
consume valuable energy of others. This is elaborated in section 3.4. 
• Collusion Attack – Attackers may work together to improve their attacking ability. 
Section 3.5 is devoted for its treatment in RACS. 
• Slander Attack – Attackers can also recommend undue blacklisting (minimizing of 
reputation) of others. Discussion about it is elaborated in section 3.5. 
• Masking Attack – A node may pretend to be another one while transmitting messages. 
Details about it are provided in section 3.6. 
 
Please note that, RACS is a reputation-based system. Whenever message forwarding requests 
come to a node, it prioritizes them according to reputation of their respective sources and 
processes in that order. If more than one source has same reputation, they are arranged in first-
come-first-serve basis in the message queue. Selfish nodes need not be punished because, as 
soon as acknowledgement arrives from destination of a communication path to the associated 
source node, RACS increments reputation of all routers to the source. Malicious nodes are 
subjected to detection and punishment (even blacklisting i.e. minimization of reputation almost 
throughout the network). RACS stimulates malicious nodes to detect malfunctioning of other 
malicious fellows instead of conspiring against selfish ones. 
 
3. SYSTEM MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
Different nodes are assumed to have different transmission power and be equipped with two 
antennas – i) one omni-directional antenna essential for broadcasting and ii) one uni-directional 
antenna for unicasting messages to the nodes with very high reputation (also termed as friends) 
to the predecessor node (router/source). Omni-directional antenna is used to unicast messages to 
those who are not known to be friends of the transmitting node. Each node has a unique link-
level address which cannot be changed and is included in all messages that it transmits / 
forwards. RACS ensures that current timestamp is a part of every message generated in an ad 
hoc network. A fuzzy controller named Adaptive Penalty Decider (APD) is embedded in every 
node to incorporate rationality in decision-making as far as penalizing others is concerned. 
Unless on the verge of complete exhaustion, each node ni transmits HELLO messages at a 
regular interval τhello(i) (this interval is non-uniform). Receiving a HELLO message, all 
downlink neighbours nj of ni  send acknowledgement (ACK) to ni which contains information 
about identification number, present coordinate position, radio-range, current timestamp, hello 
interval and minimum time required to process and forward a message, of ownself and 
downlink neighbours (conforming to last HELLO message transmitted by nj). All these 
attributes are automatically included in all data and route-request packets generated by a node. 
Values of these attributes of ni, along with the same of its most recent set of uplink and 
downlink neighbours are included in HELLO message of ni. After transmitting or relaying a 
message, a node waits for a maximum interval of τ′ seconds to receive acknowledgement. If no 
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ACK reply arrives within the mentioned time-span, the message is resent. This may be repeated 
at most 3 times (one initial transmission, two retransmissions). Current timestamp is embedded 
in all messages transmitted in the network. Each node is equipped with a message queue. Size 
of message queue of ni is denoted as mi. Received messages are stored here for processing and 
forwarding, which takes place in order of reputation of the associated nodes to ni. Whenever 
malicious behaviour of a node is detected with proof, the node is blacklisted to the detector as 
well as to all those nodes who receive the allegation intimation along with supportive digital 
documents broadcasted by the detector. If a node is blacklisted, then all messages generated by 
it would be discarded without consideration, by all other nodes in the network. RACS also 
assumes that no node is capable of distorting content of a message transmitted by any other 
node. 
   Assuming that Φ is the present set of all nodes in the network, maximum and minimum 
reputation of a node are |Φ| and -|Φ|, respectively. If reputation of a node nj to another node ni 
becomes less than -|Φ|, nj is blacklisted to ni although the information cannot be broadcasted 
throughout the network since explicit proof of non-cooperation is not available (complains 
without document are treated as slander attack and nodes raising slander attack are blacklisted to 
all those who receive allegation from it). In this situation, messages generated by nj are treated 
by ni with least priority, ni does not assign any message forwarding task to nj. On the other hand, 
if a malicious node nj is caught red-handed, it is blacklisted network-wide and no node 
entertains its message forwarding requests and all complains generated by it are completely 
ignored. 
3.1. The forwarding procedure 
Characteristics of ad hoc network entities or nodes are mentioned below: 
 
• Current set of neighbours of a node ni is denoted as N(i). Although this is a function of 
time, we have ignored the fact in our notation for simplicity of representation. 
 
• Class of network elements may be broadly classified into i) selfish nodes and ii) 
malicious nodes. A selfish node is either a) supportive or b) interrupt-driven. Objective 
of a selfish node is to save its own resources and maximize its reputation to others, as 
much as possible. A supportive node is one who renders service to others without 
explicit request or responsibility. For each such enthusiastic cooperation, reputation of a 
supportive node is set to α|Φ| (α > 1) to all nodes who are benefited from it. For 
example, consider a communication path ni→nj→nk which satisfies the following 
conditions:  
a) ni ∉ N(j)  
b) There exists a node nl such that nj ∈ N(l), nl ∈ N(j), ni ∈ N(l) and nl ∈ N(i). 
Then, nl is termed as a witness in the path from ni to nj. After nj forwards a message sent 
by predecessor router ni, nl also receives a copy of that which it bicasts to both ni and nj. 
As ni receives the broadcasted packet, it compares the message sent by it and received 
copy of nl. If they are identical, then honest and responsible service of nj is confirmed 
by unforeseen contribution of nl and thereby, requirement of an explicit multi-hop 
acknowledgement initiated by nj, is eliminated. Here nl is an example of supportive 
node and its response is treated as implicit acknowledgement. If a selfish node is not 
supportive, then it is interrupt-driven. On the other hand, objective of a malicious node 
is to consume network resources and conspire against others as much as possible, till 
the expense is bearable. 
 
• In a communication path ni→nj→nk, if ni ∉ N(j) then nj bicasts its packet to be 
forwarded before retransmissions begin with its two destinations being itself and nk. nj 
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deliberately transmits its received copy to ni provided it is about to leave the radio-circle 
of ni. If a proper ACK arrives from destination to ni where ni is either a source or a 
router, reputation of relaying nodes who are successors of ni, get incremented by α to 
their respective predecessors. Reputation of generator of the message reduces by α2 to 
every router. Otherwise the situation is identified as link breakage and treated in section 
3.2. Here it may please be noted that ACK messages are also bicasted with ownself 
being the additional receiver. If a node is on the verge of going outside the radio-circle 
of its predecessor and properly informs the previous router about it, RACS ensures that 
its predecessor does not complain to other network elements against it.  
 
• A node never complains that its successor has not responded when the successor has 
already acknowledged. This is true for malicious nodes also. 
 
• A node does not complain against its successor provided the received copy of bicasted 
transmission has already arrived at it. This is true for malicious nodes also. 
 
• The routers for whom neither predecessor is within its radio-range nor witness support 
is available, append received copies of message bicasted by itself, along with 
acknowledgement during its traversal from destination to source. This copy is extracted 
by the respective predecessor and replaced by its own received copy of bicasted 
message. If no acknowledgement arrives from destination after a pre-computed time 
interval, each node voluntarily returns received copy of its bicasted message to the 
predecessor. 
 
 
3.2. Link Breakage Attack 
Consider a communication path … ni→nj→nk …Assume that ni sends a data packet at time t1 to 
nj and did not receive any acknowledgement till t1+3τ′ i.e. after two retransmissions. 
Immediately ni issues a route-request message to nk excluding nj. If any such alternative path is 
found, ni inquires nk about HELLO messages transmitted by nj between timestamps t1 and 
t1+3τ′. Maximum number of HELLO messages of nj received by nk within the mentioned time 
interval is denoted as y and defined in (1). Significance of τhello(j) has been described earlier.  
y = 3 τ′ / τhello(j)                                                                                                              (1) 
Let, the actual number of HELLO messages received by nk from nj between timestamps t1 and 
t1+3τ′, be x. If x < y, then ni communicates with other downlink neighbours of nj at that time, to 
extract as many HELLO messages of nj as possible, within the mentioned time interval. 
Assuming that x′ number of such HELLO messages are collected and nj was found to be within 
radio-range of ni in x′′ number of those messages, ni decides to blacklist nj network-wide, 
provided x′ = x′′ = y. Thereafter, each concerned honest downlink neighbour of nj is felicitated 
by α2 reputation to all other nodes in the network. On the other hand, if x′ < y, reputation of nj to 
ni, is modified according to rule bases of Adaptive Penalty Decider (APD). Accumulating all 
those HELLO messages if it is found that some downlink neighbour nl of nj tried to conceal at 
least one HELLO message of nj within the interval t1 and t1+3τ′, then nl is also blacklisted 
network-wide by ni.  Otherwise, nl gains α2 increment in reputation to ni only, if allegation of 
link-breakage attack against nj is not confirmed.  APD accepts the following input parameters 
and produces reputation-adjustment-quotient (RAQ) as output.  
 
i) Comparative Reputation – Let Rimin and Rimax indicate minimum and maximum 
reputation respectively of all nodes who have communicated with ni so far, 
cooperative reputation Ci(j) of a node nj to ni, is defined in (2). 
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Ci(j) = (Ri(j) - Rimin)/( Rimax - Rimin +1)                                                              (2) 
Here Ri(j) is the current reputation of nj to ni. High comparative reputation Ci(j) of a 
node nj increases its trustworthiness to its predecessor ni. Please note that, 
0≤Ci(j)<2|Φ|/(2|Φ|+1). 
 
ii) Expectation – Let Tj(i) and Fj(i) respectively denote amount of traffic node nj has 
generated to ni  and total number of message packets ni has forwarded for nj, so far. 
Expectation Ej(i) of node ni from nj is defined in (3). As per this formulation, we 
can conclude that 0≤E
 i(j)<1. 
            Ej(i) = Fj(i) / (Tj(i) + 1)                                                                                     (3) 
            In spite of high values of Ej(i), if nj does not cooperate with ni, acceptability of nj to 
ni significantly decreases. 
 
iii) Correctness – Correctness Zi(j) of the decision of punishment of nj by ni, is 
expressed mathematically in (4).  All symbols carry their usual meaning.    
Zi(j) = 1 – ( 1 - x′′ / (x′ + 1) ) ( 1 - x′ / (y + 1) )                                                (4) 
From (4), it may be noted that 0 ≤ Zi(j) < 1. Correctness more than 0.5 signifies 
that, nj was present within radio-range of ni in about more than half of the occasions 
after the last message packet was transmitted repeatedly (for 3 times) by node ni to 
nj. This recommends strong penalty against nj in the form of its reduction in 
reputation in its predecessor. 
 
iv) Path Length – Let p indicate the total number of nodes from source to destination in 
the associated communication path and q is the same before current silent router nj, 
who is suspected to have issued the link breakage attack. Then, fractional length of 
path P(j) traversed up to node nj, appears in (5).   
P(j) = q / p                                                                                                       (5) 
Please note here, 1/H < Pi(j) < 1, where H is the maximum hop count in the 
network. Low values of q signify that the destination is still far away and route-
request packet generated by the predecessor of nj will have to traverse a 
substantially long way to reach the destination, compared to total length of the path. 
Hence, values of P closer to 0 claim severe punishment for nj. 
                      
Divisions in crisp ranges of the above parameters along with associated fuzzy variables are 
shown in table I. Assuming that ƒ(Φ)=2|Φ|/(2|Φ|+1), comparative reputation C is divided into 
four uniform ranges between 0 and ƒ(Φ). Similarly, range division of P and  E take place 
uniformly over the interval  [1/H , 1] and [0 , 1], respectively. As far as range distribution of 
correctness Z is concerned, it is quite strict. At least 50% of this parameter is required to 
decrease reputation of the node suspected to issue link breakage attack, to its predecessor. 
 
Table I  :  Crisp Range Division of C, E, Z and P Along With Fuzzy Variables 
Crisp Ranges 
of  E, RAQ 
Crisp Ranges of  
C 
Crisp Ranges 
of Z 
Crisp Ranges of P Fuzzy 
Premise 
Variables 
0 – 0.25 0 - ƒ(Φ)/4 0 - 0.50 1/H – 1/4(1+3/H) a 
0.25-0.50 ƒ(Φ)/4 - ƒ(Φ)/2 0.50 – 0.65 1/4(1+3/H) – 1/2(1+1/H) b 
0.50-0.75 ƒ(Φ)/2 - 3ƒ(Φ)/4 0.65 – 0.85 1/2(1+1/H) - 1/4(3+1/H) c 
0.75-1.00 3ƒ(Φ)/4 – 1.00 0.85 – 1.00 1/4(3+1/H) – 1.00 d 
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Fuzzy composition of C and E is shown in table II that produces temporary output ρ1. ρ1 is 
combined with Z in table III generating another intermediate output ρ2. Ultimate output RAQ is 
produced as per table IV as a function of ρ2 and P.  
 
Table II  : Fuzzy Composition of C and E producing ρ1 
C  → 
E  ↓ 
a b c d 
a b b a a 
b c b b b 
c d c c c 
d d d d d 
 
Table III  :  Fuzzy Composition of Z and ρ1 producing ρ2 
Z  → 
ρ1  ↓ 
a b c d 
a a b b c 
b a b c c 
c a b c d 
d b c d d 
 
Table IV  :  Fuzzy Composition of P and ρ2 producing RAQ 
P  → 
ρ2  ↓ 
a b c d 
a b a a a 
b c b b b 
c d c c c 
d d d d d 
 
Updated reputation of nj to ni is given by (6).  
 
                 Ri(j) κ(RAQ)   if total number of occasions for which nj was suspected to issue link   
                                     breakage attack against ni, is less than M 
Ri(j) =                                                                                                                                (6) 
              -|Φ|    Otherwise 
 
Here κ(RAQ) = ((RAQ)low + (RAQ)high)/2 and RAQ ∈ {a,b,c,d,e}. As far as crisp range division 
of RAQ is concerned, alow = 0, ahigh = 0.25,  blow = 0.25, bhigh = 0.50, clow = 0.50, chigh = 0.75 and 
dlow = 0.75, dhigh = 1.00. M is the maximum number of times nj may be suspected to have raised 
link breakage attacks against ni, before Ri(j) reaches -|Φ|. 
 
Proposition 1. In a communication path … ni→nj→nk …, if nk is selfish, it surely provides ni 
correct information regarding the HELLO messages transmitted by nj, during the time interval 
t1 and t1+3τ′ (all symbols carry their usual meaning). On the other hand, if nk is malicious, the 
damage that it may cost to the entire network is bounded. 
 Case-1  nk is selfish 
Let ψ1 be the probability that ni has found a route to nk excluding nj. Probability that nj is 
blacklisted, is given by ψ2. ϑh(k) and ϑd(k) denote gain in reputation of nk through cooperation 
and selfishness, respectively. Mathematical expressions for these appear in (7) and (8). Please 
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note here that if nj could be blacklisted, reputation of nk increases by α2 to all nodes in the 
network except itself and nj. Based on the assumption that Φ is the set of all nodes in the 
network, resultant gain in reputation for nk in this situation, is α2 (|Φ|-2). On the other hand, if nj 
could not be blacklisted, reputation of nk increases by α2 to ni only. If ni does not find any route 
to nk excluding nj, Ri(k) does not change. As far as ϑd(k) is concerned, since nk has decided to 
conceal at least one HELLO message transmitted by nj within time interval t1 and t1+3τ′, 
network-wide blacklisting of nj becomes impossible. Hence, reputation of nk increases by α2 to 
ni only. 
 
ϑh(k) =  ψ1{ψ2α2 (|Φ|-2) + (1-ψ2) α2}+ (1-ψ1)0 
i.e. ϑh(k) =  ψ1{ψ2α2 (|Φ|-2) + (1-ψ2) α2}                                                                         (7) 
 
ϑd(k) = ψ1α2 + (1-ψ1)0 
i.e. ϑd(k) =ψ1α2                                                                                                                                                                                                  (8) 
 
Please note that, ϑh(k) - ϑd(k) = ψ1ψ3α2 (|Φ|-3) (surely, |Φ| > 3)                                       (9) 
From practical point of view, we can say that |Φ| > 3, hence (ϑh(k) - ϑd(k)) > 0. 
This ensures that a selfish node never breaks a communication link deliberately. 
Case-2  nk is malicious 
Objective of a malicious node is to cause as much harm as possible to other network elements 
till the consequences are bearable to itself. If nk conceals some HELLO messages of nj 
transmitted between timestamps t1 and t1+3τ′, from ni, intentional misbehaviour of nj, if at all, 
will surely escape detection. Also nk undergoes the risk of getting isolated from the network. 
Even if malice of nk remains undetected, upper bound of damage it may cause to the network is 
given by HMσ(|Φ|-1) where H, M and Φ carry their usual meaning. Given that Dmax indicate the 
maximum of all radio-ranges in the network, σ is the approximate energy required to transmit a 
message by 1-hop where the associated downlink neighbour is at a distance of Dmax from its 
predecessor. Hence, it is proved that if a node is malicious and tries to raise link breakage 
attack, the damage that it may cause to the network, is bounded. 
3.3. Deliberately Delaying The Traffic 
In a communication path … ni→nj→nk …, let t1 be the timestamp when ni relayed a message to 
nj and nj forwarded the same to nk at time t2. After nj receives a message and stores in the 
message queue, maximum possible waiting time in the queue is (mj-1)τ where τ is the uniform 
time span required to process and forward a message and mj is size of the message queue of nj. 
ni broadcasts network-wide allegation against nj for deliberately delaying the traffic provided 
(t2-t1)>((mj-1)τ+3τ′); all symbols carry their usual meaning. Implicit acknowledgements or 
received copy of bicasted message is attached as proof along with the complaint. Otherwise 
reputation of nj to ni is adjusted by APD again. In this case it accepts all parameters except path 
length P and correctness Z is redefined as (10). 
Zi(j) = (t2-t1)/((mj-1)τ+3τ′)                                                                                             (10) 
Here also Z lies between 0 and 1. Values closer to 1 emphasize punishment of nj. As far as 
deliberately delaying is concerned, Z follows uniform range distribution like E and RAQ. 
Output is produced from table III i.e. ρ2 = RAQ. For a communication path r, assuming that 
λ(r) be the total number of routers in it, time interval Γ(r) for which source node waits for 
arrival of acknowledgement from destination is given by expression (11). 
Γ(r) = (λ(r)+1) τ + (τ+3τ′)λ(r) + ∑( ml-2) τ                                                                    (11)                                                         
                                                 nl∈λ(r) 
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Here (λ(r)+1)τ is the lower bound of waiting time before arrival of acknowledgement from 
destination, while rest of the expression (11) is the upper bound. If acknowledgement does not 
arrive within interval Γ(r), each node voluntarily returns received copy of the message bicasted 
by itself, to their respective predecessors. Same proactive procedure is followed by the nodes for 
which link with the predecessor is about to be broken before time interval Γ(r). If there exists 
any node ni who did not receive the said proof of cooperation from its successor nj, tries to 
establish a communication path to successor of nj excluding nj itself, to inquire whether nj 
forwarded the message to it. If it is found that nj has forwarded the message properly, Ri(j) is 
incremented by α, otherwise Ri(j) is minimized. If no such alternative path could be established 
from ni to successor of nj and it happened for M number of occasions so far, then also Ri(j) is 
minimized. 
 
3.4. Injecting Enormous Traffic 
RACS allows a maximum of  η route-requests per second. In our simulation, we have set η = 5. 
If any downlink neighbour nj of ni receives more than η number of route-requests from ni in one 
second (may be in different destinations), nj broadcasts an allegation against ni with last η+1 
route-requests as proof. Timestamps embedded in those messages establish the fact that they 
were broadcasted within time stamp of one second. Thus ni is isolated from the network. 
 
3.5. Collusion Attack 
Collusion is the act of cooperating with another node’s misbehaviour. According to RACS, 
selfish and malicious nodes deal with collusion requests differently. As far as RACS is 
concerned, possibility of collusion lies in the following situations.  
i) In a communication path … ni→nj→nk …,  nj raises a link breakage attack against ni 
and asks nk to collude with it by concealing some HELLO messages of nj 
transmitted between the time interval t1 and t1+3τ′ (t1 and τ′ carry their meaning as 
in section 3.2).  
ii) Neighbours of a node ni may collectively decide not to forward its messages and 
thereby isolate it from the network. 
Situation i has already been discussed in section 3.2. Proposition 2 below proves that, 
irrespective of whether a node is selfish or malicious, gain through honesty is higher than the 
gain through collusion. 
Proposition 2. Irrespective of whether a node is selfish or malicious, it is a better option to raise 
network-wide allegation against network element issuing  malicious collusion requests.  
Proof : Assume that nj and nk are two network elements s.t. nj, nk ∈ N(i). nj issues a collusion 
request to nk for conspiring against ni.  
Case-1  nk is selfish 
Let ϑh(k) and ϑd(k) denote the gain of nk possible through honesty and colluding with nj, 
respectively. Assuming that Φ is the set of all nodes in the network, mathematical expressions 
for ϑh(k) and ϑd(k) are computed in (12) and (13).If nk decides to behave honestly, it will raise 
network wide allegation against nj with received copy of collusion request from nj against ni as 
supporting digital document. This will blacklist nj and fetch a reputation of α2 to all other 
network elements except nj and itself i.e. resultant gain in reputation amounts to α2 (|Φ|-2). On 
the other hand, if nk colludes with nj in its conspiracy against ni, it gains reputation α2 to nj only. 
 
ϑh(k) =  α2 (|Φ|-2)                                                                                                            (12)  
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ϑd(k) = α2                                                                                                                        (13) 
ϑh(k) - ϑd(k) = α2 (|Φ|-3) 
 
 Again, from practical point of view, we can say that |Φ| > 3, hence (ϑh(k) - ϑd(k)) > 0. 
 
Case-2  nk is malicious 
If nk decides to collude with nj,  the situation is equivalent to issuing link breakage attack against 
ni or some 2-hop uplink neighbour of ni. We have already proved in proposition 1 that damage 
caused by nj to the network is bounded, for both the above-mentioned situations. Moreover, the 
risk of getting caught red-handed is there. On the other hand, if nk raises network wide 
allegation against nj, it can surely blacklist nj for ever and the effect is much more severe than 
that of link breakage attack. Moreover, it fetches benefit for nk in terms of reputation, which is 
mathematically expressed in (12). 
3.6. Slander attack 
If a node ni raises allegation against another node nj without proof, then it is not 
entertained and ni is blacklisted throughout the network. 
 
3.7. Masking attack 
Whenever a node generates a message, its unique node identifier automatically gets embedded 
in it, which cannot be changed. As per this constraint of RACS, a node cannot pretend to be 
another one. 
4. ALGORITHM 
The communication algorithm in RACS is presented below in detail in procedure 
communication where ni is sending a message to nj for forwarding. It illustrates the technique to 
deal with link breakage attack and deliberately delaying traffic attack. On the other hand, 
whenever some route-request message arrives at nj from ni, nj behaves according to procedure 
route_req to detect injecting enormous traffic attack. Pseudo code of ‘route_req’ and the 
procedures called from within the procedure ‘communication’ are presented in the appendix A.  
 
Procedure communication (node ni, nj, ns, nd) 
begin 
 /*  this procedure illustrates communication from ni to nj, from the perspective of ni after a path is 
established between them. ns and nd are source and destination node respectively */ 
 flag = 0 
 /* flag is a Boolean variable which is assigned 0 initially. It will be set to 1 if a reply is received from nj 
after at most 3 retransmissions */ 
  if (nj ∉ ni.comm_history) then 
  begin 
  /* ni is communicating with nj for the first time*/ 
    reputationi[j] = 0; 
    link_breaki[j] = 0; 
    deliberate_delayi[j] = 0; 
    blacklisti[j] = 0; 
  end 
 t1 = sys_time(); 
 /* sys_time is a function which returns current timestamp of the system*/ 
 send_msg(ni, ni, nj, t1); 
 /* the message is transmitted by ni for the first time at timestamp t1. It is bicasted to both ni and nj */ 
 reply1 = receive_msg(ni, ni, t1); 
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/* reply1 indicates copy of the bicasted message  transmitted and received by ni */ 
 reply = null; 
  for p = 1 to 3 
   begin 
     reply = receive_ack (ni, nj, sys_time()); 
     /* if any acknowledgement arrives from nj to ni, then it is stored in a variable named    
         reply. If no reply comes then the message will be resent and this may continue at  
         most three times */ 
       if (reply is not null) then 
        begin 
          flag = 1; 
          break; 
        end 
       else 
       begin 
         tlast = sys_time(); 
         send_msg(ni, nj, sys_time()); 
         /* during retransmissions, the message is unicasted to next hop router */ 
      end 
    end 
      t2 = sys_time(); 
      z =  (t2 – t1) / τhello(j)  ; 
      /* z is the estimated number of hello messages of nj between timestamps t1 and t3 */ 
      if ( flag = 0) then 
   begin 
    /* nj has kept mum to message forwarding requests sent by ni */ 
    black_count = 0; 
     /* black_count will store number of hello messages which support blacklisting of ni  
         throughout the network */ 
    all_reply = null; 
    /* all_reply will consists of responses of all members of N(j), where N(j) denotes   
       current set of downlink neighbours of nj */ 
    xarray = yarray = tarray = null; 
    coord_count = 0; 
   /* tarray is the array which will consist of unique timestamps among responses of all  
      downlink neighbours of nj. xarray and yarray will store corresponding positions of nj  
      in terms of x and y coordinates. Cardinality of all these arrays will be indicated as  
      coord_count */ 
      for each node nk ∈ N(j)  
       begin 
         hello_count[k] = 0; 
         /* hello_count[k] is supposed to store the number of relevant hello messages of nj  
             forwarded to ni by nk */ 
         send_helloenq(ni, nj, nk, t1,t2,sys_time()); 
         /* ni sends an enquiry to all nk ∈ N(j) regarding hello messages of nj between  
             timestamps t1 and t2 */ 
         reply_dlnebr = recv_reply(ni, nj, nk, sys_time()); 
        /*  reply_dlnebr is a variable is a variable which stores reply of nk in response to  
            enquiry of ni regarding relevant hello messages of nj, as mentioned in the  
            message send_helloenq */  
        all_reply = all_reply ∪ reply_dlnebr; 
        /* response of nk is appended to the variable all_reply */ 
        for l = 1 to z 
         begin 
           if (exhausted(reply_dlnebr) = 1) 
            break; 
           /* exhausted is a function which accepts an array as argument and returns 1 if end  
              of array is reached, otherwise it returns 0 */ 
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            hello_count[k] = hello_count[k] + 1; 
          /* more hello messages of nj are left in response of nk to enquiry of ni */ 
            info[k][l] = extract_nexthello (reply_dlnebr, l); 
         /* extract_nexthello is a function which accepts response of nk and current value of  
             loop counter variable l, as argument. Its purpose is t extract l-th hello message of  
             nk from reply_dlnebr and store it in info[k][l] */ 
        /* each element of info consists of three attributes: 
i) suspected_x : x coordinate of the node suspected to have raised link breakage attack 
(here it is nj) 
ii) suspected_y : y coordinate of the node suspected to have raised link breakage attack 
(here it is nj) 
iii) tmpstamp  :  timestamp of info[k][l] 
             found = 0; 
             /* found is set to 1 if info[k][l] has already been processed */ 
              for e =1 to coord_count 
                begin 
                  if info[k][l].tmpstamp = tarray[coord_count] then 
                   begin 
                     /* this hello message has already been processed */ 
                     found = 1; 
                     break; 
                    end 
                  end 
            if (found = 1) then continue; 
            xarray[coord_count] = info[k][l].suspected_x; 
            yarray[coord_count] = info[k][l].suspected_y; 
            tarray[coord_count] = info[k][l].tmpstamp; 
            coord_count = coord_count + 1; 
            /* individual attributes of info[k][l] are appended to xarray, yarray and tarray;  
                hence coord_count is also incremented */ 
           d = √(ni.x- info[k][l].suspected_x)2+(ni.y- info[k][l].suspected_y)2; 
           /* d is the distance between ni and nj at time info[k][l].tmpstamp */ 
           if (d < radio_range(i)) then 
           /* it is concluded here that nj was within radio-range of ni at time  
               info[k][l].tmpstamp */ 
           black_count = black_count + 1; 
          end 
         end 
        while not (exhausted(all_reply)) do 
        /* the loop continues till response of all downlink neighbours of nj has been processed  
        by ni */ 
          begin 
           s = -1; 
           /* s is a variable that is supposed to store number of honest downlink neighbours of  
               nj */ 
      for each node nk ∈ N(j)  
       begin 
         hello_cnt[k] = 0; 
         /* hello_cnt[k] is supposed to store the number of relevant hello messages of nj  
             that should have been forwarded to ni by nk */ 
         tot_record[k] = -1; 
         tmvar = search_time (all_reply, nk,0); 
         /* search_time (all_reply, nk,0) extracts timestamp of first (0-th) hello message of nj  
             from response of nk. It is stored in variable tmvar */ 
           while tmvar ≠ 0 do 
              begin 
                tot_record[k] = tot_record[k] + 1; 
                tmp[k][ tot_record[k]] = tmvar; 
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                xcoord[k][ tot_record[k]] = search_posx (all_reply, nk, tmvar); 
               /* search_posx is a function which returns x coordinate of nk at time tmvar */ 
                ycoord[k][ tot_record[k]] = search_posy (all_reply, nk, tmvar); 
               /* search_posy is a function which returns y coordinate of nk at time tmvar */ 
               xco_ord = search_posx (all_reply, nj, tmvar); 
               yco_ord = search_posy (all_reply, nj, tmvar); 
               /* xco_ord and yco_ord store x and y coordinate respectively, of nj at time  
                   tmvar */ 
              dist1 = (xco_ord- xcoord[k][ tot_record[k]])2; 
              dist2 = (yco_ord- ycoord[k][ tot_record[k]])2; 
              dist = √(dist1+dist2); 
             /* dist indicates distance between nj and nk at time tmvar */ 
              if (dist <radio_range(j)) then 
              /* here it is concluded that nk was neighbour of nj at time tmvar */ 
              hello_cnt[k] = hello_cnt[k] + 1; 
              tmvar = search_time (all_reply, nk,tmvar); 
              /* new value of tmvar is the next timestamp extracted by search_time function  
                  from all_reply, after value of tmvar in previous pass through the loop */  
             end 
           end 
         if (hello_cnt[k] = hello_count[k]) then 
         /* nk did not conceal any relevant hello message of nj from ni */ 
         begin 
           s = s + 1; 
           arr [s] = k; 
          /* nk is appended in the list of honest downlink neighbours of nj*/ 
         end 
        end 
      end 
  sum_hello_found = 0; 
  for each node nk ∈ N(j)  
    sum_hello_found = sum_hello_found + hello_count[k]; 
  /* sum_hello_found is total number unique hello messages received from all members  
      of  N(j) */ 
  if ((black_count = z) or (black_count = z - 1)) then 
   begin 
     for each node nm ∈ Φ 
      /* Φ is the set of all nodes in the network */ 
          send_allegation_link (ni, nj, nm, all_reply,arr,s,sys_time()); 
         /* ni alleges nj of raising link breakage attack while all_reply works as the  
             supporting digital document. After receiving this allegation, nm executes a  
             procedure termed as receive_allegation_link. */          
    end 
  else 
  /* nj could not be blacklisted. So, its reputation to ni would be set to -Φ if this kind of situation occurred 
for M number of times as far as the communication from ni to nj is concerned. Otherwise, the fuzzy 
controller named adaptive penalty decider is invoked for link breakage scenarios through a function 
APD1 */ 
 begin 
  link_breaki[j] =  link_breaki[j]  + 1; 
  if link_breaki[j] > M then  
      reputationi[j] = -Φ; 
  else 
     reputationi[j] = APD1 (black_count, sum_hello_found, nj, ns, nd); 
 end 
end 
 else 
  begin 
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   /* reply is available from nj */ 
   t3 = retrive_timestamp (reply, nj); 
   mj = retrive_sizeofqueue (reply, nj); 
 /* t3 is the timestamp when nj forwarded the message from ni to its successor in the communication path 
*/ 
/* mj is the size of message queue of nj */ 
 if ((t3-tlast)>( mj -1) τ) then 
  begin 
    /* nj has deliberately introduced delay in the traffic */ 
     for each node nm ∈ Φ 
      /* Φ is the set of all nodes in the network */ 
          send_allegation (ni, nm, nj, reply, reply1,sys_time()); 
     /* After receiving this allegation, nm executes a procedure termed as  
         receive_allegation */ 
          blacklistm[j] = 1; 
        /* nj is blacklisted to nm */ 
         reputation
 m[j] = -Φ; 
         /* reputation of nj is minimized to nm */ 
         reputation
 m[i] = Φ; 
       end 
      end 
  else 
   /* nj could not be blacklisted. So, its reputation to ni would be set to -Φ if this kind of situation occurred 
for M number of times as far as the communication from ni to nj is concerned. Otherwise, the fuzzy 
controller named adaptive penalty decider is invoked for link breakage scenarios through a function 
APD2 */ 
 begin 
  deliberate_delayi[j] =  deliberate_delayi[j]  + 1; 
  if deliberate_delayi[j] > M then  
      reputationi[j] = -Φ; 
  else 
     reputationi[j] = APD2 (t3, tlast, nj, reply, reply1);  
   end 
 end 
end 
 
5. SIMULATION RESULT 
In our simulations, nodes are randomly deployed inside a rectangular space. Each node moves 
according to a random-waypoint mobility model. In this model, a node starts at a random 
position, waits for a random duration called the pause time, then randomly chooses a new 
location and moves to that location with random velocity ranging between 0 and maximum 
allowable velocity in the network. When it arrives at the new location it waits for a random 
pause time and repeats the process. The physical layer assumes a transmission range model 
fixed for individual nodes although transmission ranges of different nodes are different. One 
node can successfully communicate in single hop with another node provided the second node 
is within radio-range of the first one. Important simulation parameters are listed in table V. We 
have used ns2 [15] simulator. 
   Each selfish node acts as a service provider, which randomly picks another node as receiver. 
Packets are scheduled to be generated according to a Poisson process. Total number of 
malicious nodes varies from 0 to 500 in different simulation runs. Anyone of them randomly 
picks a strategy of causing damage to network.  
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Attributes attri of a node ni are as follows: 
i) node_id                                           : i 
ii) latitude                                            : lati 
iii) longitude                                         : longi 
iv) radio-range                                      : radi 
v) velocity                                           : vi 
vi) interval between  
           consecutive hello messages             : τhello(i) 
 
 
Table V:    Important Simulation Parameters 
Total number of nodes 500 - 5000 
No. of malicious nodes 0 – 500 
Dimension of space 2000 m × 1000 m 
Maximum radio-range 250 m 
Network-wide maximum velocity 50 m /s 
Network-wide minimum interval between consecutive HELLO 
messages 
6 seconds 
Network-wide maximum interval between consecutive HELLO 
messages 
10 seconds 
Interval between consecutive retransmissions of a message 10 seconds 
Maximum number of route_requests per second 5 
Data and control packet size 512 bytes 
Link bandwidth 1 Mbps 
Simulation Time 3600 seconds 
Number of simulation runs  6 
 
 
As per the simulation scenario presented in table V, size of attri is (log25000 + log22000 + 
log21000 + log2250 + log250 + log230) bits i.e. 53 bits. N~(i) consists of first seven elements of 
N(i) after they are arranged in decreasing order of proximity with ni. Assuming that U(i) 
indicates current set of uplink neighbours of ni, U~(i) consists of first four elements of U(i) after 
they are arranged in decreasing order of proximity with ni. In all the message formats mentioned 
below, first 4 bits are message code which range from 0 to 14.   
   Based on selfish nodes’ forwarding decision, three systems have been implemented in the 
simulations: the proposed RACS system, CONFIDANT [4] and Attack-resistant Cooperation 
Stimulation [7]. All these mechanisms deal with both selfish and malicious nodes. Relevant 
performance metrics used here are described below. Among them, the first one is reputation 
efficiency of selfish nodes, which is the total profit gained by all selfish nodes (in terms of 
reputation for RACS and CONFIDANT [4] or energy for Attack-resistant Cooperation 
Stimulation [7]) divided by the total number of selfish nodes.  It is followed by average damage 
received per selfish node, which is the total damage (in terms of percentage of reputation for 
RACS and CONFIDANT or energy for Attack-resistant Cooperation Stimulation) received by 
selfish nodes divided by the total number of selfish nodes. The next performance metric is 
average damage received per malicious node, similar to the measure of Average damage 
received per selfish node. Last performance metric is correctness of detection of malicious 
nodes which is ((1-mal_det / act_mal ) × 100). mal_det signifies the total number of malicious 
nodes detected and act_mal is the actual number of malicious nodes participating in 
communication sessions of simulation. 
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Fig 1.  Graphical demonstration of selfish nodes average reputation efficiency vs number of 
malicious nodes 
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 Fig 2.  Graphical demonstration of damage received per malicious node vs number of malicious    
 nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.  Graphical demonstration of damage received per  selfish node vs number of malicious 
nodes 
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Correctness of detection of malicious nodes vs 
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Fig 4.  Graphical demonstration of correctness of  detection of malicious  nodes vs number of 
malicious nodes 
 
Table VI   :  Improvement of RACS over CONFIDANT and Attack-resistant Cooperation 
Stimulation 
Performance metric RACS over 
CONFIDANT 
RACS over Attack-Resistant 
Cooperation Stimulation 
Selfish nodes average profit 
vs number of malicious 
nodes 
33.32% 31.45% 
Damage received per 
malicious node vs number of 
malicious nodes 
37.19% 32.1% 
Damage received per selfish 
node vs number of malicious 
nodes 
38.67% 27.32% 
Correctness of detection of 
malicious nodes vs number 
of malicious nodes 
29.28% 22.34% 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
RACS is a reputation-based, completely distributed method of detecting and preventing selfish 
and malicious activities in ad hoc networks. In contrast to the earlier schemes, it employs nodes 
themselves to monitor activities of other nodes; need for intervention of any centralized body 
has been intelligently eliminated. The communication procedure has been described in details 
along with the structure of various categories of control and data packets. RACS discriminates 
between intentional and unintentional selfish and malicious actions. Nodes that detect 
malicious/selfish activities of others are recognized network-wide, whereas the culprits have to 
suffer depending upon their degree of non-cooperating and harmful attitude. Simulation results 
present in section 5, strongly establish the effectiveness of our proposed RACS system. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Pseudo code  for the procedures receive_allegation and receive_allegation_link are presented below. 
 
Procedure receive_allegation (node ni, nj, nm, string reply, reply1, integer t) 
 begin 
   if(check(reply, reply1, ni, nj)=1) then     
   /* check is a function that investigates guilt of nj according to the digital proof  
       all_reply. It returns 1 if nj is found guilty. Otherwise it returns 0. */ 
    begin 
       blacklistm[j] = 1; 
        /* nj is blacklisted to nm */ 
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         reputation
 m[j] = -Φ; 
         /* reputation of nj is minimized to nm */ 
         reputation
 m[i] = Φ; 
        /* reputation of ni is maximized to nm because ni has detected misbehaviour of nj */ 
        /* nodes narr[s] supported ni in its procedure of detecting misbehaviour of nj .So, their  
      reputation is also maximized to nm */   
      end 
   else 
    begin 
       blacklistm[i] = 1; 
        /* ni is blacklisted to nm */ 
         reputation
 m[i] = -Φ; 
         /* reputation of ni is minimized to nm */ 
       end 
     end 
 
 
 
Procedure receive_allegation_link (node ni, nj, nm, string all_reply, integer array arr, integer s, integer t) 
 begin   
   if(check(all_reply,null, ni, nj)=1) then     
   /* check s a function that investigates guilt of nj according to the digital proof all_reply.  
       It returns 1 if nj is found guilty. Otherwise it returns 0. */ 
    begin 
       blacklistm[j] = 1; 
        /* nj is blacklisted to nm */ 
         reputation
 m[j] = -Φ; 
         /* reputation of nj is minimized to nm */ 
         reputation
 m[i] = Φ; 
        /* reputation of ni is maximized to nm because ni has detected misbehaviour of nj */ 
        /* nodes narr[s] supported ni in its procedure of detecting misbehaviour of nj .So, their  
            reputation is also maximized to nm */   
             for t = 0 to s-1 
                 reputation
 m[arr[t]] = Φ; 
      end 
    else 
     begin 
      blacklistm[i] = 1; 
        /* ni is blacklisted to nm */ 
         reputation
 m[i] = -Φ; 
         /* reputation of ni is minimized to nm */ 
       end 
     end 
 
Procedure route_req (node nj, ni, ns, nd, integer tm) 
begin 
 /*  this procedure illustrates how nj deals with route request message from ni transmitted at time tm */ 
 msg = store_rreq(node nj, ni, ns, nd, tm); 
 /* the entire route request is stored in a variable termed msg by store_rreq function*/ 
 if ((ni ∉ nj.rreq_history)  or  (tm-time[i][j] > 1)) then 
 begin 
  /* ni has sent a route-request to nj for the first time or after at least one second from the earlier route-
request */ 
  rreq[i][j] = 0; 
 /* (rreq[i][j]+1) is the number of route requests of ni to nj after at least one second from the earlier route-
request */ 
  time[i][j] = tm; 
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  setoff_req = null; 
/* time[i][j] is timestamp of last route request message of ni to nj */ 
 end 
else 
  begin 
   if (rreq[i][j] < 5) 
    begin 
     rreq[i][j] = rreq[i][j] + 1; 
     append (setof_rreq, msg); 
    /* setof_rreq is the set of route requests of ni to nj after at least one second from the  
        earlier route-request */ 
     self_or_mal = random(1); 
      if (self_or_mal = 1) 
       /* nj will forward the route request message because it has decided to cooperate  
           with ni */ 
          forward (nj, ns, nd, sys_time()); 
     end 
    else 
     begin 
        for each node nm ∈ Φ 
      /* Φ is the set of all nodes in the network */ 
          send_allegation (ni, nj , nm, setof_req, sys_time()); 
      /* After receiving this allegation, nm executes a procedure termed as  
           receive_allegation */ 
       end 
     end 
end 
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